WITHIN 3 DAYS of his inauguration US President Gerald Ford had made it quite clear that when it comes to defending the interests of American big busisess he is going to be just as dedicated as his predecessor. One of the "new" President's first acts was to send a message to the South Vietnamese dictator, Thieu, promising continued aid and support.
It is mainly the support of the USA which has kept Thieu in power; support in the form of 1,500 tanks, 900 aircraft and more than one million tons of ammunition since January 1973, a recent "loan' of 1000 million dollars sneaked past Collgress (with more yot to come), and over 10 thousand 'advisers" who run Thien's police, jails, and pacification' programmes, command hus bomber squndrons and direct his South Vietnam's dictator Thieu: worried about President Ford's intenti However, even this is not enough. Thieu's army (the ARVN) is using up weaponry faster than it can be supplied. Part of the thinking be hind the recent saturation bombing of the liberated zones controlled by the Provisional Revalutionary Government was to force Ford's hand. Thieu was afraid that the American bourgeoisie would use the opportunity of baving a new Presi dent to cut down their rather embitrassing commitments to him. But Ford responded as Thieu hoped Thicu's position is nonetheless worsening. In the last few months, a number of important bases in the Central Highlands, Mekong Delta, the Coastal regions and around Saigon have been liberated by the NLE The ARVN has suffered heavy losses, the town of Thuang Duc has heen SOUTHALL RED FORUMS: Every Friday evening at 9 p.m. in the Festher captured and two others have been isolated. Now the South Vietnamese soldiers are either degerting in large numbers or refusing to fight without massive air cover something which it is becoming increasingly difficult to provide.
In the towns political opposicion Sontinues to build up, with even the right wing catholic clergy adding their Voices to the clamour.
RESPONSE
Thieu's response has been twofokl. The scale of millary involve ment has escalated, but there has also been a change in the character of military operations. Formerly air strikes were only used in support of ground offensives, but the roont raids on Loe Nian and the fights over Hanci and Haiphong are interded purely to terrorise the liberated The response to the urban unrest is more complex. Thieu cannot afford to ignore the charges of corruption, nor can he simply arrest the critics since they are largely people on whose suppor he depends. Instead he has looked for a scapegoat, and found one in Vietnan's ethnic Chinese populatio There has been a long history of resentment of the Chinese in this part of the world, and Thieu has used this (as have his counterparts in Thailand and Malaysia) to try to channel political opposition into racist outbursts.
This is his objective in the recen seizure of 118 Vietnamese refugees of Chinese origin in Hong Kong, thi -trial, and the sentencing of several death or life imprisonment. Now, whenever the criticisms become toc loud, a raid on a lew brothels or gaming houses produces a handful of ethnic Chinese to blame for the latest bit of corruption to have bee discovered.
What the immediate future hold is not yet clear. The NLF's military offensive has been greatly intensifie with u definite turn to direct attack on supposedly "secure ARVN rear bases, including munitions depots, airfields and even oil depots and tankers in Saigon itself. These attac are all designed to demoralise the ARVN further and undermine thei ability to fight, as well as expose th weakness of the Thieu regime.
Also unclear are the intentions o the UiS. What is certain is that it wi be difficult for Kissinger and the P king bureaucrats to make a deal on the Vietnamese revolution when Kissinger visits China in the coming monchs Also certain is that those of us who support the NLF must not all the manoeuvres of Thieu and his U masters to go unchallenged, and mut prepare for the show down which !
ahead.