certainly be close.
But the results of the first round already allow one to draw certain conclusions about the state of the left in France.
The first thing which stands out is the truly staggering size of the vote for the extreme left. The candidates of the organised left, Alain Krivine (Front Communist Revolutionnaire Revolutionary Communist Front) and Arlette Laguiller (Latte Ouvriere Workers" Struggle) polled almost 700,000 votes between them, with Krivine getting 94,044 and Laguiler 593,370.
PRESSURE
In addition to them, however, 337,894 votes also went to Rene Dumont-an independent, but a leftist who rejected Mitterrand's leader Mitterrand has been truly tremendous.
What this shows is the tremendous extent to wleen the oraanisationaland to some extent, deological-hold has declined.
The thrust of Mitterrand's campaign was the most left-wing seen in France since the days of the Popular Front in 1936. Yet even so, he was unable to druw in a very definite section of the population behind his campaign.
Similarly, the Socialist Party bas not succeeded in croating any nass orginisation corresponding to its new electoral weight. All this shows just how leftist" mass parties in Europe would have to be now to sweep the vanguard in behind them an the scale of the 1930s or 1940s, Che Guevara's brother Juan is among The scoond thing which stands out is the very large vote for Lagniller. The campaigns of the FCR and LO showed very clearly the differ. ences in character between the two of the Communist and Socialist parlies organisations.
PROPAGANDA Lutte Ouvriere is an organisation basically built through propaganda.
Like the International Socialists in Britain, it therefore recruits most rapidly in periods of downturn in the strugele, when individual propaganda becomes the main Tou of activity; and it has a far tower weight in strumple than one would expect from its size, The Front Communiste Revolütionnaire, on the contrary. is an organisation built chiefly through contral campaigns. It is A central part of the FCR's campaign dealt with the lessons of Chile, particularly in relation to the future role of the French army. of the coming period. the vote they expected had 6,000. muinly geared up to intervene in decisive strugeles, and has grown procisely in periods of mass struggle.
This difference came out clemly in the campaigns of the two organisations. The FCR analysed that if Mitterrand were to win the political situation would move towards severe controntations. In such a situation, it was necessary to raise the consious ness of the working claws to the tasks LESSONS OF CHILE For this reason, a central part of the FC's campaign dealt with the Boots lessons of Chile, the role of the French army, etc; and it generally had a very "hard" character. This led, among other thing, to die accusation of the situation were clearly revol by the Minister of Defence that Krivine was inciting mutiny -un incident which lost the FCRa number of votes by scaring off potential supporters. The FCR were, however, satisfied overall term pains. by their campaien. and gor ahoul Within the political van guard, certainly the FCK undoubtedly had a more important unpact than Lutte Ouvriere. The sales of the daily paper put out by the FCR during the campaign have averaged 15-20,000 a day, and on the May Day demonstration in Paris the FCR's contingent was around 10,000 in comparison to LO's 6,000, At the big meetings of the campaign ar the Palais des Sports in Paris, the FCR-with a local mobilisation bod 7,000 present, and LO with a national mobilisation PERSONALISED In contrast to the FCR's cam- the FCR. palen, that of Laguiller and LO tended to become personalised and non-political. The front page of Lutte Ouriere in its last issue before the clection consisted of a hig photograph of Laguiller with the slogan*Vote for. Arlette becuse she tells the truth'. She ran as ta worker and a woman, avoided questions on Chile, and did not deal with the All thus is not of course becuuse LO are "betrayers'. It is because they have a wrong conception of the role of the revolutionary party.
They conceive of the party not as preparine the working class for the tasks of the coning period, hut as organising the working class to go forward 'one step at a time'regardless of whether the crisi the objective tasks and the bour geoisie ate going forward one step at a time or in Seven League This is why, for example, in May 1968 they stuck fize at econontic demands when the tasks utionary ones. Their policy is dis asizous in terins of a crisis situation such as could develop if Mitterrand is elected But in periods of relative calm it can undoubtedly reap sbort POLITICAL SUCCESS But baving understood what was wrong with Lutte Covere's campaign from the point of revolutionary politics, we must also note its significaner as a social fact. Laguilier's votes were not votes 'for Lulte Ouvriese in cle same sense as Krivine's weie votes for the Front.
Bot Laguiller's votes were undoubtedly. votes against Mitterrand from the left'. She succeeded in tapping to a relatively massive extent widespread dissatisfaction with Mitterrand. In that sense LO scored a notable political success, and it was greeted as such by the comrades of The situation on the left in Franco is now extraordinary. With nearly a million votes for tie extremo Jelt, the Coottist Party has been forced to admit that the leftists" are even a force on the electoral tield. Revolutionary politics is really in business in at least one country in Europe!
or police under the Lanusse dictatorship. Now it is reported chat he may