was the title of an article in The Times on 30 October. In it, Victor Zorza analysed the debate within the North Vietnamese leadership, and confidently predicted a new "Hanoi offensive.' The following day, the US State Department sent a 'ster note" to Hanoi, warning them against "violating the ceasefire. At the same time, the South Vietnamese military intelligence released a report of the alleged move ments of North Vietnamese troops and their 'violations of the ceasefire. Since then, there have been almost daily reports of communist violations' (most of them, incidentally, inside the liberated areas and 'atrocities, What lies behind this?
PRECARIOUS The Thieu regime in South Vietnam is now threatened from all sides as it slithers precanously from one crisis to another.
In an attempt to curh the soaring inflation and the balance of payments crisis, the piastre has heen devalued five times since the ceasefire. In the cities, there are widespread food shortages and mass unemployment, a situation which is made worse by the corruption which exists throughout the administration. Under these pressures, the previously dormant urban masses railway workers a few months ago and the demands of the students and ethnic minorities for the implementation of the democratic rights promised in the January agreement, directly threatened the government. Even sectors which formerly backed Thieu are becoming disillusioned. Some even talk of bringing back Bao Dai, the senile ex-emperor who served as a puppet ruler for the French. Japanese and Americans in turn. But the real mood of these layers was shown in the violent demoestrations of Catholics (who made up Thieu's social base) and war veterans. which took place in August and September. In the villages, Thieu's authority is being systematically eroded by the movement of peasants from the Saigon-controlled to the liberated areas. Attempts by the ARVN (South Vietnamese army) to halt this drift have been repeatedly crushed, while the Joint Military Commission (which was intended to neutralise the NLF) has shown itself to be completely impolent.
REST OF INDOCHINA The situation in the rest of Indochina can only deepen the isolation of the Thieu regime. The settlement in Laos, and the continuing dedline of the Lon Not clique in Cambodia, have swung the balance of forces in Indochina very much in favour of the libration forces. The of the government means that the continuation of military aid from Bangkok is also doubtful. Thieu's power rests on three elements. The first of those is US aid which is now less dependable, given the demands of the Middle East war and the effects of Watergate (notably Congress's new ability lo override Nixon's veto by the necessary majority), Also Important are sections of the urban population, who feared the Provisional Revolutionary Governmont marginally more than they feared Thieu but are now rapidly changing their minds. Finally, Thieu depends on the support of the army and the repression it carries out. In the present period this is the crucial factor. Thieu cannot allow the slightest let-up in the repression if be is to maintain his position. Any concessions would open wide the floodgates and inevitahly lead to the toppling of his regime. His only answer to the problems of the masses, his only solution to their demands, is to increase the viciousness of his rule. ESCALATION This is the real situation behind the notes from Washington and Saigon, To keep Thieu in power, his grip must he lightened and the dissidents whipped into line, But this is ditticult in an atmosphere of so-called peace and rising mass expectations.
Communist League militant Michel Recanati (left) on his way to freedom beyond niggling incursions into the liberated areas and the bombing and defoliation of these regions, A major offensive into the Central Highlands last month was attempted (and smasted), and a second front into the Mekong Delta (which is more difficult to defend, and where there is rice desperately needed by Saigon) was opened three weeks ugo. The "warnings" and learned articles in the bourgeois press must therefore he seen us a careful propaganda exercise to prepare the ground and provide prior justification for a massive offensive against the liberation forces, In this respect, the fact that the warnings were directed at Hanoi, and not the Pruvisional Revolutionary Government, is particularly ominous In the face of this, it is the clear task of the solidarity movement to maintain constant vigilance against the manoeuvres of Thieu and his imperialist masters; to respond immediately and decisively to any move which endangers the Indochinese revolution, and to keep up the constant demand for the implementation of democratic liberties in South Vietnam (especially the release of all political prisoners) and the recognition of the Provisional Revolutionary Government by Brilain.
David Johnson Fourth International