The bloody, counter-revolutionary upheaval which recently descended upon the Chilean workers and peasants brought to an end an experience of great historic importance for the world working class movement. For Chile represented a concrete, practical test of one strategy for the transition from capitalism to socialism.
This'strategy claims to map out a road to socialism which can by-pass large-scale violent struggle through the skilful use of the existing institutions of the capitalist state, to elect a soctalist government which will gradually undermine the power of the capitalist ruling class.
This is the strategy put forward by the Communist Parties, and the left-wing of the social democratic parties, throughout the world, It is, for example, clearly the plan which underpins the recently forged Union of the Left' in France, and is the basic idea behind the British Communist Party'> British Road to Socialism.* Chile now gives us a full-blown test of this strategy in action. While advocates of the "parliamentary road" have been in business for a long time, in Chile they achieved unparalleled success in their own terms: they managed to accomplish their central objective - the formation of a povernment - and held this position for almost three yeats.
Of course, the Popular Unity Government did have to contend with many untavourable dircumstances. But the power of the capitalist class 1 not ust an idca trom a Marxst textbook - it is part of the harsh fabric of reality. The only serious testing ground for revolutionary strategy is the real world of the class struggle. That world is bound to be full of 'unfavourable circumstances.' Indeed, what is the purpose of a strategy in the first place if it is not to minimire the weaknesses of the revolutionary forces and maximise their strengths in order to defeat the ruling class, despite 'unfavourable circumstances'?
In looking at the ways in which the British Left has discussed the lessons of Chile, we are not merely examining their powers of historical gement - we are getting a foretaste of how the various sections of the Left would fare in a "Chile" situation, of their ability to face up to the tasks with which a revolutionary situation a Britain would confront us all.
COMMUNIST PARTY
It should come as no surprise that the Comunist Party of Great Britain has found in the Chilean events nothing to contradict the theory of the parliamentary road.' That theory has been the official basis of Party activity for over twenty years, To express doubts about the strategy of the perliamentary road now would raise awkward questions about much of the history of the CPGB and the entire international Communist movement.
The CPGB, then, defends the political course of the Popular Unity Government, and in particular of its sister party, the Chilean Communist Parly which, more than any other Popular Unity pariner, can claim to be the architect of the 'Chilean Road.' For them the disaster was an unavoidable product of the "unfavourable balance of class forces' - Le. the hostility of the Chilean middle classes to Popular Unity.
The only way out of this dead-end was for Popular Unity to win over greater numbers from the muddle class. In the words of Jack Woddis, head of the CP's international departmeat (Morning Ster, 22 September!: .. the central pontical sin or the forces or popul Unity was to drive forward the implementation of its programmie, step by step, in order to weaken the economw and pudical positins ol the bie canstalists and landowners and detach from their skle a substantal section of the peasants, urban petty-bourgeoisie (shop keepers, lorry-owners, small manufacturers, ete professional people and technicians, and women, and even some a'chons of workers who un Chile have usually voted Christian Democrat or Nationalet ... I Popular Unily had been able to gain more time, then there woukd have been the possibility of winning a decisive majority of the people and this would have had it impact on the armed forces too." The ahysmal hankruptey of those who pur. forward this kind of argument is cicarly exposed in one sumple tact they are totally unable to propuse any possible way out of the dilemma in which Popular Unity found itself, All they can do us mumble it Popular Unity had been able to gain more time..." But how could Popular Unity have gained this time? Do our advocates of the parliamentary road' expect the forces of reaction to behave "Tairly" and give the Left chances to carry out its programme? In fact, the three vears which Popular Unity was able to snatch from the hands of a crisis ridden capitalism was a more generous allotment than the Left should count upon having in future.
TIME FOR WHAT?
What if Popular Unity hadhoen miraculously granted more time? What would it then have ve done to forestall the counter-revolutionary offensive? According to Woddis it would have been a simple matter of 'winning a decisive majority of the people which would have had its impact on the armed foroes too." But there is nothing magic about winning a majority — it cannot by itself disarm the forces of counter-revolution or guarantee the success of the revolutionary forces. In fact, the Popular Unity coalition did succeed in getting a majority of votes in the municipal elections held six months after it came into Government, This, of course, did nothing to solve the problems created by the hold of reactionaries over the Chilean Congress. But Popular Unity had always realised that the Chilean political set-up would be an obstacle to the carrying out of their programme, even if it had majority support. They had therefore planned to hold a popular referendum to introduce a radically new constitution which would overcome this obstacie. They hesitated to take this step after their victory in the municipal elections not so much from fear of losing the vote as from fear of winning: because a step like this could have unified the reactionary camp and threatened an immediate military coup.
Similar problems faced them with regard to the army. A solid majority behind Popular Unity would only have had its impact on the army tou if it had been used to back up a campaign within the ranks of the army against reactionary political idcas, and if the power of the counter-revolutionary Génerals were broken. But it was precisely this the Government refused to do, again for fear of alienating the military and provoking a coup. As Chilean Communist Senator Volodia Teitelboim stated (Morning Star, 15 October): After the failure of the attempted coup of June 29, 1973 there begun the arrest and punishment in Chile's navy of sailors and petty officers who were opposed to the coup. In other words, the Government sat by and let its supporters in the navy be punished for the 'crime" of supporting the Government!
An clectoral majority is only useful as a weapon to back up the correct policies: with the wrong policies such a majority is just another set of figures.
BALANCE OF CLASS FORCES The "balance of class forces' cannot be reduced to a numbers game, What is referred to is the relative political strength of the two main soc tal classes - The working class and the bourgeoisie (capitalest class).
The ultimate source of the power of the bourgeoisie is its hold over the state (especially the repressive machinery army, police und courts), its economic position (owner of capital, possessor of "business secrels": information necessary for the running of the cconomy and the influence of pro-capitalist ideas over other sections of the population, The power of the working class derives from its decisive position in the cconomy (the supplier of labour power), its capacity for organisation and united action, and its ability to put forward a practical, alternative model for the running af society to that tepresented by the bourgeoise and their In the course of the ciass struggle cach class will une its own weapons. The bourgeoisie will use its control of the coonomy cither in a spontancous tashion (withholding of investment for lack of contidence or an organised way deliberate economic sabolage), it will carr sut systematic propaganda appealing to th law, "established institutions, mation al raditions.' cte. and will ultimately rely upo be forces of the state machine to defend it interests, The working class will adopt strikes and mass demonstrations as its main castroments of struggle.
The "balance of class foroes' will be determined by the ability of cach class to maximise its own positions of strength and weaken the strategic positions of its enemy, For example, a successful lock-out by the bosscs will both undermine the organisation and unity of the working class and consolidate the economic power of the bourgeoisie.
A successful factory occupation has the opposite effect: it strengthens the working class on its own terrain and undermines the cconomic power of the bourgeoisie. Yet Popular Unity in power opposed mass factory occupations as ultra-left, claiming that they would alienate middle class support. But a Government determined to influence the "balance of class forces" would not set its sights upon a few extra votes, but upon measures that would contribute decisively to organising the camp of the working class and disorganising the camp of the bourgeoisic. From this standpoint a wave of factory occupations would be a major step forward. Indeed, the most powerful means of influencing the "balance of class forces" is to encourage and push forward every anti-capitalist initiative that comes from the masses: factory occupations, land seizures, requisitioning of casential supplies.
WORKERS' GOVERNMENT
The role of u Government that really represents the interests of the working class is not to obstruct mass initiatives, but to coordinate them and provide them with the stamp of Government authorily, For example, a ware of factory occupations could be organised into a national ayatom of workers' control of production, with elected workers' committees scrutinising the production process, breaking the capitalists" monopoly of "business secrets," ensuring that Government planning requirements are met, and preventing economic sabotage. Coupled with direct state control (nationalisation) of the 'commanding heights" of the cconomy this would shatter the economic power of the ruling class and thus tip the 'balance of class forces" decisively in favour of the working class.
Similarly, local committees that spring up to deal with prices and shortages of essential goods could be extended into a national system of workers' control of distribution, Indeed, in the wake of widcapread economic sabotage by the bouracoisie the Popular Unity Government set up popular supply committees (the JAPs) to ensure the distribution of easential goods, . However these bodies had very limited power to act on their own initiative, and their activities were systematically obstructed by the any, acting in the interests of the bourgooisic.
As the class struggle develops, the ruling class will turn increasingly to the forces of the state for support. Popular initiatives and bodice which are dependent upon the capitalist state are doomed. There must be created a popular authority to carry out anti-capitalist measures, and this authority must have the moans necessary to defeat harassment by state forces -Le. it must have its own armed forces. For this reason the question of an armed workers' militia is central to the 'balance of class forcus.' This is the essence of the 'armed road" - not a technicolour spectacle of workers seizing guns and staging a shoot-out with the ruling class, but the existence of an armed popular power to prevent the mass struggle from being at the mercy of armed capitalist power. The "peaceful rouders' always make u token acknowledgement of the possibility that the ruling class will put up armed resistance, but they systematicaly refuse to prepare for this eventuality. The "armed road" is not of neceasity a "violent road," any more than the 'unarmed road has turned out to be a peaceful road.
What is also clear is the necessity to create local bodies of popular authority to direct the mass struggle, control the workers' militia, and prevent the state from carrying out its counterrevolutionary job. Such bodies are expressions of an important asset of the working class its capacity for organisation — and spring up spontaneously in the course of the class struggle.
In Chile, these took the form of cordons focal workers' action committees) and "communal command centres' (which linked the cordons with popular committees in the workers' residential districts). Given full hacking from the political forces of the Left and the Government, such bodies could have Part of the IMG contingent on the demonstration against the military coup passes the Chilean Embassy
; BRITISH LEFT rapidly developed into a national system of popular authority with deep roots in the struggle of the masses — into soviets.
MIDDLE CLASS
The advocates of the "parliamentary road" lay great stress on the need to win support from the middle class. And they are correct in this: the middle class represents the principal mass base for the bourgeoisie, and is the main source of personnel for staffing the various agencies of the capitalist state, To split the middle class -winning over a section to the workers' camp, neutralising others, and leaving only a small fraction allied with the bourgeoisie - is an important objective of revolutionary strategy. But the "peaceful road" theorists repeat the old mistake of thinking that this can be done by being kind to the middle class, by being very "moderate," and showing a willingness to compromise with the capitalist order. The error of this idea has been pointed out long ago. Writing about France in 1935, Leon Trotsky had this to вау:
Puliamentary cretins who conster themselves connolaeurs of the people like to repeat: "One must not frighten the middle dasses with revolution. They do not like extremes." - Naturally the petty proprietor prefers order so long as business is going well and so long as he hopes that tomorrow it will go better. Bat when this hope is lost, he is easily enraged and in ready to give himself over to the most extreme measures. Otherwise, how could he have overthrown the democratic state and brought Fascism to power in Italy and Germany? * _ But the petty bourgeoisie can also find a leader in the proletariat... To bring the petty bourgeoisie to its side, the proletariat must win its confidence. And for that it must have confidence in its own strength. *It must have a clear programme of action and must be ready to struggle for power by all possible means. Tempered by its revolutionary party for a decisire and pitiless struggle, the proletatiat says to the peasants and petty bourgeoisie of the cities: "We are struggling for power. Here is our programme. We are ready to discuss with you changes in this programme. We will employ violence only against big capital and as lackcys our wan you cours we aesan to concuc as alliance on the basis of a given programme. " The peasants will understand such language. Only, they must have faith in the capacity of the proletariat to seize power ... It is necessary to understand the situation and to place oneself seriously on the revohitionary road.* / Wihither France?)
The determined measures necessary to organise the power of the working class and undermine the power of the bourgeoisie, tar from alienating the middle class, are ine only way to win them over. A Government resting firmly upon a working class growing daily in strength and self-confidence, taking sweeping measures to solve the economic and social crisis of capitalism, would exercise a magnetic attraction over the most numerous layers of the middle class. But what did they actually see in Chile? A Government paralysed by indecision: warning of the danger of a military coup, calling on the military to maintain a "professional", nonpolitical stance, and then inviting the very same military into the political arena by offering them cabinet posts; denouncing the manoeuvres of imperialist high finance, but then continuing to make payments on international loans incurred by previous Governments, cating up foreign reserves, cutting off many, imports, and contributing to some of the worst inflation in Chile's history; noting the hostility of American imperialism, but then allowing the Chilean military to continue receiving aid and training at the hands of that same imperialism.
REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY At every stage in the development of the Chilean struggle the Popular Unity coalition was presented with the alternative: rely upon the struggle and organisation of the masses and deal with the crisis throuph anti-capitalist measures, or rely upon the bourgeois state and hold back the mass struggle in order to compromise with the ruling class and its agents. These same choices will face the British Left as the crisis of capitalism deepens in this country. They can be seen in a preliminary form in the struggles of today: at every stage the advocates of the "peaceful road" in this country call on workers to look to the bureaucratic heads of the workers movement for leadership. The International Marxist Group, on the other hand, while not opposing moves to force the bureau crats into action, has systematically put forward proposals for extending the organisation of those in struggle, so that they will be able to lead that struggle themselves.
Photo: Chris Davies (Report) In a recent exchange in the paper of the International Socialists, Socialist Worker, Communist Party member Bob Rowthorn quotes sections from the "British Road to Socialism' to show that the CP is aware of the need to take strenuous measures against the military and the capitalist state machine. But Chile shows us quite clearly that the behaviour of those who take the 'parliamentary road' is not determined by the words they write in their programmes in times of relative peace, but by the unavoidable logic of the situation which they create in time of crisis by relying upon the capitalist state and failing to create an alternative source of power through the promotion and organisation of mass struggie independent from the capitalist state and the working class bureaucracies.
The record of Chile speaks far louder than the words of a Party programme: the 'parliamen tary road' is the road to compromise, political paralysis and defeat. The only viable revolutionary strategy is that which places the struggle of the working class and its allies at the very centre, consciously strives to extend, unify and organise such struggles, and sees in the organisations which grow directly out of the struggle of the masses the sole source of the power necessary to destroy capitalist rule. A revolutionary strategy must work towards the creation of a situation of "dual power' - a situation in which the working class and its allies are organised to the point that in every sphere of social life orgins of mass struggle exist alongside the organisations of the ruling class, challenging their right to rule. Such a network of organisations - a network of soviets - would be the basis for a revolutionary workers government to carry through all the measures necessary to break the power of the capitalist class on all fronts and establish workera power. This was the road which Popular Unity did nor take in Chile - but it was the only road to victory.
REVOLUTIONARY LEFT
So far we have concentrated our attention on the advocates of the "parliamentary road". But what have the revolutionary left had to say about the lessons of Chile?
The most important organisations of the revolutionary left-the Socialist Labour League and the International Socialists- have always been scathing critics of those who seek to focus socialist strategy on parliamentary and electoral activity, so they bave found little dilficulty in making generally correct criticisms of the Popular Unity coalition, In particular, they have pointed out very forcefully that Chile confirms the basic Marxist teachings on the need for the working class to destroy the capitalist state machine.
However effective revolutionary criticism must go beyond general points of this sort: it must be able to show how such generalities can indicate an alternative way forward, to demonstrate that there is a remiutionary road to workers' In this respect the record of the revolutionary left is not impressive neither the SLL nor the IS have shown any capacity to come to grips with the problem of a revolutionary stratees for the Chilean situation.
Hecause of this fading the criticisms of groups like the IS and the SLI have been doubly barren: on the one hand they allow the defenders of the peaceful road to retain the initiative by not taking up the central problems facing the Chilean working class and, on the other, they produce no concrete lemons tor revolutionaries in Britain.
The reason for this failure b not difficult to locate. As ae have already argued, the only altemative way forward for the Chilcan working class morement was the road of dual power" is the forging of an altemative, embryonic state power out of the organs of struggle crealed by the activity of the masses, on which the authority of a genuine worker government could he based. But this conception finds no place in the political thaught or practice of either the Socialist Labour League or the International Socialists SOCIALIST LABOUR LEAGUE they have a universal remedy for every ill: "build the revolutionary party"
Of course, the creation of a revolutionary party is essential if the power of the capitalist class is to be overturned. But the recognition of this fact only allows us to correctly pose the central questions: How is this party to be built? Once built, how is this party to "conquer the masses'how will it become 'the leadership"? And once it assumes a position of leadership precisely what will it lead the masses to do? On these key questions the SLL has almost nothing to The SLL has an essentially bureaucratic concep tion of revolutionary leadership and of the new revolutionary party. For them revolutionary leadership is the TUC General Council flying the red flag and quoting Trotsky: just another version of the present set-up, only with a different set of orders being issued-'destroy the state' instead of trust the state", etc What they fail to understand is that revolutionary leadership can only exist in a totally different context from the present, reformist leadership: revolutionary leadership presupposes the mobilisation and organisation of the masses independent from the state and the bureaucracy. The revolutionary party can only be built in the process of promoting such mobilisation and organisation, and revolutionaries can only win the icadership of the masses on such a basis.
The International Socialists are practitioners of a similar political quackery. Recently they too have become devotees of huilding the party.
But beneath this similarity of phrase, they hold a very different conception from that of the SLL. For them the party (with the addition of its front-type "rank-and-file" bodies) is the organisation within which the masses will be gathered to coordinate their struggles and press their independent demands.
This idea is twice confused. On the one hand it fails to understand that a real independent mobilisation of the masses cannot organise itself securely through the medium of a political party or parties (which of necessity will only draw in the most politically aware), but requires the creation of organs of genuine proletarian democracy - bodies that encompass the entire class, from the most advanced to the most backward, and draw in other anticapitalist social groups.
At the same time, this idea produces misguided attempts to turn a revolutionary organisation into an organisation of the masses through the frenetic recruitment of anyone who doesn't protest too much. This creales an organisation without a clear political foundation, without a politically educated and disciplined member ship, and incapable of operating in a manner that is both democratic and at the same time centralised. Such an organisation will be smabie to carry out the essential lasks of a revolutionary purty: centralised intervention into the mass organs of proletarian democracy to win the leadership of the struggle and guide it along a correct strategie course towards the seizure of state power. The IS's politics blind them to the real tasks facing revolutionaries with regard to the organisalion of the masses - the development in the struggles of today of experiences of independent organisation which will preparo for the developmcot of dual power in future upheavals. At the same time these politics create an organisation that is incapable of providing genuine revolutionary leadership in the mass struggle.
It is no idle boast to say that the International Marxist Group has been almost alone among organisations on the left in being able to come lo grips with the lessons of Chile. That ablity is no accident: it is u product of our correct understanding of the direction in which a evolutionary strategy for the class struggle in Britain must be sought, and our firm roots within the international class struggie, as the British section of the Fourth International. For those same reasons we are aware of the tremendous practical importance of building active solidarity with the Chilean strugple among British workers, Such activity is essential to convince the working class of the international character of their strength and allow them to learn from the heroic sacrifices of their class brothers and sisters in Chile - to prepare them for their part in the world-wide struggle for socialiam.