In spite of the immense military successes scored by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in the last few weeks, the road to victory still seems to lie beyond its grasp.
In the past year the MPLA leadership has signed a host of agreements' with Portuguese colonialism, the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola), and UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, which were designed to open the Angolan road to neo-colonialism. Such an outcome howerch, was delca mem by une nigny com bative actions of the urban masses behind MPLA - refusing to be treated as objects of enrichment - brushed aside such collaborationist policies and finally brought down the 'transitional government'. And with the recent attempt by the Portuguese to re-establish control, the MPLA leadership was forced to nationalise the banks following demonstrations in Luanda calling for a 'peoples" governThe MPLA's vistory in Lobito against the combined forces of the FNLA and UNITA further frustrated imperialist plans for southern Africa, heightening the political and economic crisis of the coun tries in the region.
FNLA around Lobito has shown how both these forces are acting as front-runners for imperialism. UNITA is certainly far from the 'alternative' that it has claimed to be. Moreover, in the south the MPLA is at present confronted by both UNITA and South African troops who are attempting to prevent the MPLA from approaching the hydro-electric dam in the Cunene basin -Africans.
Faced with this situation, the MPLA leadership is once again seeking a compromise around the formation of another transitional government', this time just with UNITA. However the exclusion of the FLA does not, as the Financial Times correctly points out, 'exclude the possibility subsequently of UNIA meeung ENLA to incorporate it into a com mon front". The "peace agreement' with UNITA The united action of UNITA with the fight against imperialism - already occupied by the South tion of the region.
ted on the unfolding African revolution. would thus pave the way for a grave setback for the Angolan revolution, involving further assaults on the organisations of the labouring masses, including MPLA, and a total loss of the gains already made in At best, such a policy would result in the balkanisation of Angola with Zaire engulfing the oil-rich Cabinda enclave, FNLA dominating the north-west, and UNITA in partnership with South Africa conmanding the wealth of the south. Since the MPLA hold all the major ports of Angola, it would not be long before the now isolated MPLA would be smashed. allowing imperialism to establish complete domina- revolution.
Clearly such an occurrence would alter the balance of forces in southern Africa in a way that could lead to further defeats being inflicThe way to advance the Angolan struggle, therefore, is not by collaboration with reaction, but by formulating policies that are capable of undermining the intentions of reaction. The establishment of tion workers" and peasants' councils would lay the basis by which this could be done.
The present civil war has caused famine throughout Angola, in spite of the vast accumilation of food in the ports; the cities are crowded by the homeless; the vast farms deserted by the Portuguese are standing idle, while peasants remain landless and hungry; industries lie idle and deprived of technical skills provided in the past by the Portuguese. These are the probiems wnien the councus could solve in the interests of the workers and peasants of Angola. By these means, large sections of the masses influenced by FNLA and UNITA could be won to the side of The collaborationist policies advanced by the MPLA leadership only serve to place victory further out of the reach of the Angolan masses, and expose them to further danger from imperialism. As the South African troops advance from the south, and Zaire prepares from the north, time wasted on peace treaties' can only bring disaster to the Angolan revolu
red weekly 4 september 19/3 , arab east