spread disorder that the rule of even oppressive laws is impossible. More importantly, it demonstrates that the long, khaki-coloured arm of the law is of capitalist design. The Irish Republican Army of the working class have shown the working class their capabilities and indomitable strength whilst led by a revolutionary vanguard with good politics.
Implicit in the aims, methods and outcome of Provisionalism is the existence of a revolutionary nucleus. The leaders are the only people capable of creating a 32 -county, Socialist Republic. They have considered how to carry this out; and if bombing is an ancillary tactic in their arsenal then its use has been decided upon by an authoritythe revolutionary guerilla - and is not to be attacked by an armchair critic."
I would add further how the bombing campaign is able to highlight oppression and in appealing to world opinion win support for the Irish cause (acknowledge TOM)
JUST A TACTIC Thus, the Provo tactics of the last few years work into a pattern of measures contingent to victory; the truce must be seen as just one more tactic. In the truce the Provos have laid their emphasis on their sincerity and discipline; on the insincerity of the established politicians; they have again confirmed the real source of the violence; gained the confidence of wider sections of the minority subservient to an SDLP analysis; and finally braced themselves for the oncoming struggles. Incident centres have the added attraction of provoking antagonism from the losers.
A letter from Jim Clayton also appears in your columns. Himself and Grogan are like twin brothers, for he highlights the crucial political weakness of the Provos as their 'elitism' ; yet his interpretation of Irish events is so far removed from informed revolutionary opinion that it is the epitome of its own attack : elitism.
To quote him: 'In the defence of the ghettos.. the Provisionals failed to develop mass self-defence. fails to define "mass self-defence', but I detect a point: ignorance of the geography of the Irish city ghetto and a readiness to accept the term "no go' as definitive inclines Mr.Clayton to conclude that somewhere the Provos are failing. 'NO GO AREA' The answer is simple. The term 'no go area' implies a formidably barricaded and constantly beseiged quarter. In reality 'no go' areas never existed for any great length of time (apart from Derry, where there was little sectarianism and where mass mobilisations against Army intrusions were quite successful).
For four weeks in late summer of 1969 no security forces entered the Catholic ghettos because of barricades. To this day RUC incursions meet fierce successfull resistance it is these areas hostile to the RUC which have been termed "no go'. As the war developed these areas opted by thousands of British soldiers who commandeered schools, stadiums and playgrounds. existed whilst street battles ensued or as a token of mass resistance. Each time the masses were involved and the armed Volunteers gave cover.
Jim Clayton also attacks the bombing campaign, mouthing the overall Red Weekly attitude. However the logistics of guerrilla warfare dictate the Provo approach, which is more to be admired than your strict adherence to political dogma over and above successful military considerations.
Mobilisation of the masses can | again be expressed when the occupation forces have been pulled Barricades have out and effective leadership given by politicals from within the Revolutionary Army. Such overt leadership if given presently would be tantamount to giving the enemy intelligence which they can only gather from intimidation and torture.
of the Irish method that Clayton's 'Provo conspirators' do exist. However; in contrast to yourselves, their popularity and dissemination of the socialist philosophy is particularly admirable. Their excellent relinquishing of the armchair most notable.
ment.
Perhaps it's just a particular trait Provos presented themselves as attempting to police their side of the 'deal' to defend their negotiating position. But the Provos have a big dilemma. In rejecting the RUC. they have recognised the need for a community police service set up amongst the peopie (Belfast Brigade statement), and have suggested a united front of armed vigilantes.
But to whom should this community police force be responsible? What role should it play in defending the minority against violations of the truce from the British Army? Unfortunately, the Provo policy of retaliation and defence, carried out by the Provos themselves, takes the Provos right back to square one and again substitutes for mass involveNO LESSONS By posing the question yet again in terms of the Provisionals operating on behalf of the minority, rather than mobilising the minority for self-defence, the Provos are showing that they have not really drawn any lessons from the past failure.
The question of mass self-defence the Provos are elitist, because the only concrete perspective they offer is join the IRA.
If we look at the period of the greatest successes of the minority, we can spell out what we mean. It was the Provisionals who first under stood the development of the struggle from one for civil rights to that of a fight against imperialism. But it would be a mistake to see the bringing down of Stormont purely as a product of the military activity of the Provos. On the contrary, what the focus of the smashing of Stormont allowed was the development of a variety of forms of struggle-mass street demonstrations, confrontations with the British army,rent and rate strikes, etc.-in which the masses could be involved, all aimed at the same goal. All sorts of rank and file committees sprang up as a result of this mass activity-street committees, defence committees, rent strike committees and prisoners release committees. The development of the mass struggle was such that even the SDLP was forced to withdraw from Stormont, support the rent and rates strike and pledge themselves never to return