aporate. Thus Britain would achieve a retum to stability in the North without the risk of instability in the South.
REALISTIC ASSESSMENT This policy was based on a realistic assessment of the situation within the Catholic community in the North, the situation in the South and in Britain. Its weakness, and the source of its ultimate failure, was its misunderstanding of the effect of the reform programme within the Orange community. The plebeian elements in the Protestant population saw the reform programme as a threat to their economicaDy marginal, but politically important privileges. This stratum reacted by a movement to the right. But, due to Westminster pressure, the main stream Unionists, the Stormont regime, was forced to adhere to the reform programme. In this situation, the hair-cracks in the Orange monolith, the Unionist power block, became clearly visible.
The Orange monolith is structured like a pyramid, combining all classes in the Orange community in a single reactionary power block. The apex of this pyramid was led in one direction by British imperialsm, while its base shifted in the opposite direction. The effect of this was seen in the successive tumbling of Prime Minister after Prime Minister, until in August 1971 the position of Brian Faulkner, the last of the Mohicans, was threatened. Britain realised that the fall of Faulkner would be the beginning of the fall of the House of Orange: since Faulkner was the last credible Prime Minister, the fall of Faulkner would bring about the fall of Stormont. Stormont was necessary as a cement to bind the block of four classes together. British imperialism's overall plan for Northern Ireland calls for the reform of the Orange monolith. the reform of the Northern Ireland state, but it aims to maintain in its essence this reactionary, pro-imperialist power structure to use it as a lever and a prop to further British interests in Ireland.
CONFRONTATION For these reasons, on 9 August, 1971, the policy of Containment and Reform was dropped, and replaced with a policy of confrontation with almost the total Catholic community. Torture, concentration camps, murder, military brutality and repression, and Black Propaganda were used to crush the resistance in the Catholic community.
This policy was continued, despite some misgivings on the part of more experienced British counter-insurgency experts, until, in the aftermath of Bloody Sunday in Derry, it provoked the very danger that Britain most fears in Ireland - a risk to its investment and interests in the south. also saw the beginning, typified by the 31,000 strong Anti-internment League demonstration in London, of the rise of in Britain of a mass movement in solidarity with the Irish struggle. This has the potential of reaching the same dimensions as the American anti-war movement, which, to paraphrase Spiro Agnew, "threatened to rend the fabric of American society".
To avoid these dangers, Britain changed course again. The policy of confrontation, au Faulkner, was replaced with Whitelaw Mark I, as the oyster-eyed Gauleiter instituted a new policy to defeat the IRA. SIMPLE CALCULATIONS The new policy was based on relatively simple calculations. To defeat the IRA without provoking the danger of an anti-imperialist movement in the South or a solidarity movement in Britain, it was necessary to isolate the IRA from the Catholic population. To isolate it from the Catholic population it is necessary to grant such concessions to the Catholics as to endanger the "privileges" of the plebeian Protestants, and therefore to endanger the Orange monolith (see The Red Mole, 42). This risk had to be taken, and Whitelaw proceeded on his balancing act. A major part of these calculations was based on the belief that the IRA could rapidly be isolated from the Catholic community, forced to the conference table, hoodwinked and split before the complete disintegration of the Orange monolith. The success of the Republican leaders in avoiding this trap, the retreat by Whitelaw in the face of the UDA lynch-mobs on the streets of Belfast, combined to defeat this policy.
Whitelaw Mark/I was then implemented. As I explained (The Red Mole, 47) this policy was essentially one of the carrot and the big stick. In its essence a policy of confrontation, it intended to learn the mistakes of the first confrontation policy, where Faulkner had been so obsessed with the need to maintain Orange unity that he had forced the battle lines in the struggle so as to include virtually the whole Catholic community in the anti-imperialist camp. Whitelaw hopes to take on the resistance forces one by one, starting with the Provos, and to divide the Catholic community geographically by the implementation of different "profile" levels for the British army in Derry, Belfast and the border areas. After three months of this policy, it is possible to make some assessment of its success so far.
THE FALL OF WHITELAW Bearing in mind what the British policy hopes to achieve, and removing from our minds the effect of British propaganda about its success (one of the current jokes in the IRA is that the fastest way to get promoted is to be captured; then the British are sure to put you up at least two ranks in their press statements) what is clear in fact is that the British policy is in a shambles — a shambles of such dimension as to threaten Whitelaw's position. His failure to deal with the Orange-Ultras has swung the mass of the Catholic population in the ghetto areas back behind the Provos. His policy aimed at the oppos ite. His attempt to substitute the "detainment" by Special Courts for internment without trial is exposed for the fraud and the confidence trick that it is. The "Maguire revelations" and the British propaganda campaign, and the phoney peace movement, all of which were designed to split the IRA, have failed.
The Officials, whom Whitelaw had hoped to neutralise out of the struggle by this stage, are now coming under increasing pressure from within their own ranks to take a more positive role in defence of the Catholic ghetto areas.
The local government elections, central to his plan for drawing out the moderate elements" in the community, had to be postponed. The plebiscite, which was originally intended to be worded in such a way that to vote for the Union meant voting for the abolition of the ascendancy, has now, under pressure from the "Get in or get out" mob in the Tory party, been worded in such a way as to provoke the possibility of Lynch being forced to announce a similar plebiscite.
Bi-partisan policy with Labour, so essential if Ireland is to be kept out of domestic British politics, will also be endangered by this move.
The Provos, reacting from their actual experience of leading a popular movement tor more than three years, move steadily to the left, and therefore become progressively a holder organisation for Britain to deal with. ONE SUCCESS When added together, this list of failures would have been enough to have seen Whitelaw follow O'Neill, Chi-Chi and Faulkner into the dustbin of history.
That he hasn't is indicative of his one outstanding success to date. The present policy of the carrot and the big stick - or as it is now known in Belfast, "Red Berets and Green Paper" - has been successful in one of its major purposes. Because it is not an openly repressive policy, large numbers of potential supporters of the irish struggle in Britain have been confused and disoriented The potential of a mass solidarity movement which existed earlier this year in the immed. iate aftermath of Bloody Sunday has not been realised.
CENTRAL TASK In Britain, the task of building a movement in solidarity with the Irish struggle has become more difficult; and the very difficulty, instead of acting as an additional spur to sections of the British left to increase their efforts to build such a movement, has in fact been used as an excuse and a smokescreen for the betrayal of sections of the left.
The central task today for all those workers, students, Irish exiles and socialists who support the Irish struggle is to overcome these problems and in overcoming them to construct a movement capable of giving meaningful solidarity action to the Irish struggle.
At this point in time, this means building the Anti-Internment League.