The liberation forces' spring offensive des troyed Nixon's main tactic against the Vietnamese people: the attempt to rely on the mercenaries of the puppet regine in Saigon to defcat the revolution the policy knuwa as "Vietnamusation. The American administration therefore plunged into a desperale escalation of the war: for the first time the bombing was carried up to the Chines border, for the first time the lurbours of North Vietnam through which 80 per cent of the liberation forces' military supplics had passed were mined; saturation bombing of the main cities in the DRV I Democratic Republic of Vietnam Nonh Vietnamt was started and the boming of the dykes began, Asthe New York Times editorial pointed out on 10 May: "The President is in fact leading the country down precively the road though by different means that President Johnson did in 1965* STRATEGIC REASONS The New York Timer spelt out the strategic reasons for this continued escalation on % July: As the Pentagon Paperso*... (Washingion policy makers were motiv ated by the desire to contain China and what they considered to be the Asian branch of international communism' to protect the dominoes of non-Communist Asia, to discredit the Communist theories of guerilla war and wars of national beration and to demonstrate to allies everywhere that the United States would honour its pledges and make good on its threats no matter bow difficult the lask or insig nificant the tetrain"
In other works, the strategy of the Us administrations in South Last As s prompted to protect the natural resources of the regions particularly in regard to the oil deposits found after 19651 and discomage ant imperialist movements of South East Ada South East Asia ica vast reservoir of imper. blist exploitation. But the effects of n American defeat in Vietnami, or even a sethack, would jeopardice U.S. Credibility on a global scale. The New York Times sain points out, "...the Johnson administration Teared un outbreak of other "wars of nationa! liberation in the Asian, African and Latin Amencan countries and Mr MacNamara wrote in his March 16th memorandum to the President: the South Vietnam conflict ic regarded as a test case " This strategis concern had underpinned every Twid and turn of American policy in Indochina front Truman's fist involvement to Nixon s escalation.
THE CHRONOLOGY OF ESCALATION 1949: With the victury of the Chinese revolution ese freeden fighters and the growing indig Truman dropped his neutral posture so the war between the Viet Minh and the French occugalson forces in Indochina. America became militarily involved, in lose with its offensive agaanst China and the Asian Revolution. 1954: Eisenbower crcated the puppet Southern State under Dsem as the fiest step an the reconquest of Victtam by muperialism. As the Pentagon papers admity without US intervention "the Diem regime certamly, and an independent South VielSUTPINCE Early 1960's: Kennedy secretly ser combat forces into the South and as the New York Tines revealed. he simultaneously *ordered the start of a campaign of clan destine warfare against North Vietnam to be conducted by South Vietnamese agents directed and trained by the CIA and some American Special Forces Troops". 1964: U.S ractics were destroyed by the upsurge or popular resistance in the South led by the National Liberation Front. In late 1963 Detence Secretary MacNamara had reported on returning from Vietnam: "The situation is very disturbing. Current trends, unless reversed in the next two or tuce months, will lead to a neutralisation al best and, more likely, a Communist cuntrolled State" • Later U.S. propaganda clauned they were responding to an invasion from the North", hut MacNamara made it quite clear in private that the decisive peoblem was NLF control Mover a very high number of peple in certain key provinces and the "deterioration in the countryside" 1965: Johnson opened a new phase of co calation by launching the hombing of the North. The aim was to save the situation in the South hy infleting enough destruction in the North to make the DR pressur he the NIE to moderate theit actions in the South ArMaxwell Taylor. U.S, ambass ador in Saigon put it to the New York Tinies the homshing was a "will-breaking device to inflict such pain or threat of pain upon the DRY that it would be compelled to order a stand down of Vietcong violence".
196N: The Tet oftensive destroyed these Tacter and the Amercan leaders who put them into practice, Alter three years of saturation bombing. the Pentagon reported: "The Vieteung now hold the initiative" Westmorland demanded 200,000 extra troops and an mtensification of the hombing of the North and was sacked Once again hlinded by imperialist arrogance, Washing fon had underestunated the combativity bf the Vietnaniese liberation forces. Summer 1968: following a CIA report that it i out of the question for US/GVN forces to clear South Vietnam of Communist forces" and following acute demoralisation in the Us Army and great opposition to the war in the USA. Juhison opened the Park Pease talks and ended the bunting of the North to concentrate all airpower against the Soutl. Prately. as the Pentagon Papers reveal the US administration was hadly shaken, "This growing dissatisfaction accompanied, as it certainly will he, by in creased defiance of the draft and growing unrest in the cities because of the belief that we are neglecting domestic problems. runs great risk of provoking a dumestic crises of unprecedented proportions Ile demoralised Maelamara was urging I olition govermsent including the NE. Al this point Nicon took over NIXON'S TACTICS When Niser lock office at the end of 196h the too factors which were in fact central to war the determination of the Victeamnation of the American people at the atroc were heg aming to catch ep on the butchers of Viet mam. Necon-first lask was to work out Tactics to overcome these two problems His policy was three-fokd. first, the concept of "Vietnanasation" (the lactic of exing the South Vietnanese as cannon fodder in The seruggle, thus allowing him to remeve sections of US ground forces and pasty ath-war feeling al homes secondly to iry to sabiise the Then regime, thus avouding at least initially escalation of the bombing of the North, and, thirdly, to limit US invoivement increasingly to lechnical support fLe. to return to what Murray Marker i. the Warhington Post Termed the pout Korean war concepts of 'surgical and 'itmaculate" warfare").
THE MYTH OF "VIETNAMISATION' But Nixon found himself almost smmedlately wrapped in a weh ol contradactions He attempled to give the shaky Thieu reeime a breatlung space by invading Camboda and Laos in 1970 and 1971, But che only result walk a crisis for his Vietnamis ation' policy. The puppet troops adverture a Laos was summied up by the New Fort Post on 20 March 1971; "As the South Vietnamese conduct their current sweep" - a headlong retreat back to the border the perfectly good old word rour" seems more in order. They have suffered heavy casualties and withdrew immediately from the positions around Telepone - the only area in which they were outside the range of U.S artillery as scion as the North Vietnamese aftack threatened.... And this army, carried into battle by American helicopters, supported by as many ax 2,000 bombings and strafing sorties a day, totally dependent on us for defence and supply, spiking its guns and heading for home one month before even the carlicst pre-invasion estimates - This i the army President Nixon said can 'hack it on its owe!"
NEW SITUATION Thes, having set out to stabilee the Thieu regime through invasions of Cambodia and Lass, Nixon found hinself by the summer of 1971 with the following new situation he bad extended the war to a sub-continental levei; the consequence was a growing ensis for the regimes in Vientiane (capital of Laost and Paoe Pesh (capital of Canhodial i had manling for the Vietnamisation programme, and a resulting crisis of confidence in the Thieu regime whose lack of sucial base, popular support and moral fire was heing exposed Nixon therefore reverted in desperation to the techique (tried and proved lasure under Johnson) offrying to horh the North Vietnamese to their knees to pressurise then to control the libration Forces in the South. The massive thrust forward by the Uberation forces in March the car i particularly in Orang Tri province where the pupper* forces streamed South like a rabble out of control' merely emphasised the harkruptcy of the "Vietnanasation' policy. Syney I. Schanherg, echoing the humil lation Nixon had received in Loosand Carbodia. punted the picture: "Thous andk of panicking South Vietnamese soldiers most of whom dad not appear to have made much contact with the advan cing North Vietnamese Eled in confusion from Quang Tri province today. Connandeering civilian velicles at rifle paint. feiming non-existent injuries, carrying away C rations but not their ammunition and hurling rocks at Western news photographer. taking pictures of their flight, the Goverment croops of the Third Infantry Division ran from the fighting in one of the biggest retreats of the war" Nixon was thus posed with an aeute dilcaroma. cicher shandon Vietaam or up the stakes in an enprecedented and desperate tary bed to deng the Nor Valmanie him the latter couns posed a thorny proHen The dismicration of the "puppet troops meant that The only was open lo the 15 to bring the North to its knees was through the escalation of the technoIngical wat saturation hornbing directed against the ciliar population, homburg the dykes with the messoon period loomgabead, irong the harbour of Haiphong Hechniques that had been dis nosed and rejected by previous administratints: All of these actions held the risk of bring ing in the U.S. into direct conflict with the workers' states. The problem for Nixan was, therefore whether the Soviet Union and China could he persuaded not to retaliate un the face of such genocidal policies. In the event, they proved very accommodating to the butcher of Vietnam, MO Nixon's escalation tactes this Spring Jepended on one central question whether the Resian and Chinese workers' states would unite in solidarity action with the Vielnames people to crush the L.S. adminstration's genocidal tatiative. Asan administration official told the New Yor Tower on 20 May. "You can be cure that they weighed that anple with the utmost cane. If they thought there was any serious likelihood of Russian or Chinese reaction — such as sending in troop: they woulin't have gone ahead". For once both the Russian and Chinese leaderstup: did manage to find a common policy Any confusion as to the rature of des polcy must be swept out of the internatienal movement in solidanty with the peoples of Isdochina if this movement is to play an effective role in the present sitation. DIPLOMATIC MORSELS Towards Che end of tes visit to Peking in Febreury this year Nixon proclaimed at a banquet gisen in his honou-: "We hase been here a week. This is the week that has changed the world", An exageeration perhaps, but the spectacle of Chomen Lai and Nixon toasting each other on champugne as the bombs rained down on the Vietnamese certainly symbolised changes very fosourable to US global strategy The essence of Nixon's strategy towards hoth Chuca aed Russa was to offer certain tempting diplomatic morsels in exchange for a biad eye being turned to what was happening in South Fast Asia, What Nixen had to offer to the Chenere bureau cracy was above all recognition by the internalsonal commenily, resegriton witch Peking craved after wears of heing out in the diplomatic cold. There weir also no doubt abigaous promises that Taiwan would al come future date he persuaded to reach an agreement with Peking and that the U.S. ecocame h'ockade of China would be ifted As the journalist L F. Stone in the Jone :5 New York Kerica/ Broks commented "Peking bought its admission to the United