Bien Phu (May 1954), the Vietnamese liberation forces are in possession of the provincial capital of Quang Triand threaten Hue, ancient capital and second city of South Vietnam. Vietnamitation bes in a million shreds. Whole divisions of the ARVN puppet army turned and run away at Quing Tri; many turned their puns on their commanders and deserted to the side of the liberation arm) Morale in Hue and Saigon has dipped so low that even the American advisers are now admitting the possibility of a total collapse of the Thieu regime. Thieu's shuffling of commanders around Hue is an attempt to overcome the "crisis of leadentip" which Al think is the source of all Thieu's proble these stop gap, largely publicity measures will hardly succeed where the other half of the Vietnamization equation in the form of American bombs has failed.
And the bombing has been massive. Continual bombardment from over a thousand strike aircraft (130 B-52s) based on five aircraft carriers and Thailand; an all time record of sorties in one day during the final assault on Quang Tri; the virtual levelling of An Loc and now Quang Tri as well. Yet not only was the bombing not enough to save the latter city, the multi-front Vietnamese offensive has multiplied the number of areas where bombers are needed, straining air forces to such an extent that a transfer of planes to the "Ho Chi Minh trail" or'to North Vietnam could seriously weaken South Vietnamese troop positions on any of the major fronts.
As we go to press, the situation of the Thieu government is disastrous on all fronts and the Northern sector liberated, probably for good. The provincial capitals of An Loc and Kontum are still besieged and could be attacked again at any time. The Central Highlands are already cut, as the Communist forces hold most of the The period which has passed since the impoprivince of Binh Dinh on the coast and everything except Kontum further inland. In the first week of May, the main route connecting Cambodia and the Delta area of the South was cut, further isolating Pnom Penh and opening wide the rice-tich and populated Delta for troop infiltration to assist the NLF. Sporadic attacks on the last remaining relatively unaffected government outposts and cities, like Saigon, are being increased.
In the other two countries of Indochina, Laos and Cambodia, liberation forces" control of the countryside, again probably irreversible, is even clearer, In Cambodia, the FUNK controls 80 per cent of the territory and well over 60 pr cent of the population, and disputes 15 per cent of the remaining territory-leaving only 5 per cent around the capital Prom Penh in government hands. With serious assistance from regular troops, the capital could be taken as well. The situation is in fact so shaky that there were fears of total collapse of the Lon Nol regime when the students in the capital city occupied a statue in opposition!
The situation after six weeks is thus considerably more favourable for the liberation forces than many had at first thought possible. The relative ineffectiveness of US bombing in aid of press-ganged and unwilling AR VN troops has combined with the amazing determination, strategic ability, and heroism of the liberation forces to give American advisers nightmares about a Communist military victory in the South. The battle of Hue is universally seen as the turning point of the war. If Hue falls, the morale of the ARVN troops and the Thieu regime threaten to collapse completely, opening the way for a successful insurrection in the remaining cities under Thieu's police-state control, Saigon in particular.
The fall of Quang Tri marks the end of any illusions in the policy of Vietnamization-and Basically what the British ruling class is saythus poses major problems for Nixon. His support from the Western bourgeoisie, temporarily united in the face of North Vietnamese "aggression" six weeks ago, is now steadily slipping away, a process very similar to bourgeois reaction after the Tet offensive in 68. As in *68, the stock market in the US jumps every time there is news of a negotiated settlement only to plummet again when this is denied by the State Department or when another escalation is announced. For most of the bourgeoisie (as reflected in their press), the best solution seems to be a negotiated settlement and American withdrawal. In short, they see the need to bargain on the fundamental points of the PRG programme: what form of government there will be to replace Thieu.
Yet gloom is not the only emotion expressed by the bourgeoisie about the future of Vietnam: alongside the gloom there is also considerable Jear as well. Fear on the one hand because the defeat of American imperialism in South East Asia is a major blow not only for American, but for German, British, French, and Japanese imperialisms; not only for South East Asia, but for the Indian sub-continent, the Middle East, and even Western Europe and the United States, And the threat of a Vietnamese military victory is still more frightening. Only the use of "tactical" nuclear weapons can win the war for the Americans. But this would mark a return to Dulles and Cuba type brinkmanship between the United States, Russia, and now China-upsetting the fragile equilibrium Nixon has so patiently knitted together over the last four years and threatening the whole set-up of peaceful coexistence. This is indeed a frightening prospect for the European (and American) bourgeoisies, already hard-pressed by the fragility of the international monetary scheme, industrial stagnation, domestic unrest, unemployment, and so on. Britain understand that it is in their interests that British troops be defeated in Ireland, and American imperialism in Vietnam; then and only then will it make sense to talk about creating our own Vietnam at home. In the short term, the British bourgeoisie does not want further domestic trouble over Vietnam. October 27, 1968 and the VSC had their effects; disruption and mass involvement can have their effects now. Concretely, this means that we must go back to the streets over the issue of Vietnam. We must treat visiting American diplomatic and military "dignitaries" with the welcome they deserve: we must multiply the meetings of propaganda about the war and the current stage of the struggle; we must reply to any American escalation by a response in kind: American and British military hardware outposts come immediately to mind.
If there need be any more justification for the revival of Indochinese solidarity, consider the following quote from the representative of the Provisional Revolutionary Government: "We are grateful for any support you can give us, even moral support. We know that you want to do more than this but that you feel powerless. You think-we have demonstrated in Trafalgar Square, in Coventry, all over the place-but still the war goes on. So what more can we do? "No, my friends, you must do more. If the Americans carry on with the war, it's because you haven't done enough. It isn't that your demonstrations and your petitions have been useless, but that they haven't been enoughthey haven't been enough... We understand your many problems and difficulties-but they are as nothing to the problems of Vietnam." (7 Days, May 1, 1972)
Bob Braxton London, N.I.
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For more information contact the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign, c/o 182 Pentonville Rd.