The report of the Widgery Tribunal on "Bloody Sunday' in Derry, published on 19 April, predictably absolves the Army, with one or two reservations, from any responsibility for the civilian deaths and injuries that occurred on that day. One of the more astute comments came from Bernard Nossiter of The Washington Post, who wrote: There are still innocent souls abroad who think that Lewis Carroll's King and Queen of Hearts are creatures of fantasy. But the publication of Lord Chief Justice Widgery's report on Derry's "Bloody Sunday" makes clear that Alice's wonderland is very much alive. The King and Queen of Hearts, it will be recalled, presided over the Knave and invented a procedure of first sentence, next verdict and evidence last. Careful readers of Widgery's report...can only conclude that Carroll's method has served as a model." This is more than borne out by the contents of the report. Several points, specific and general. are particularly striking. 1. In his introduction, Widgery states that; "The limits of the Inquiry in space. were the streets of Londonderry in which the disturbances and the shooting took place: In time, the period beginning with the moment when the march first became involved in violence." Yet almost immediately there is a section "Security Background a highly selective. summary of the events of the previous six months, which is obviously designed to prejudice the reader before he even gets on to the events of Bloody Sunday. 2. One embarrassing fact on Bloody Sunday was, of course, that so many civilians were killed or wounded while not one soldier was hit, though Widgery estimates that, "As many rounds were fired at the troops as were fired by them" His only answer to this is that: The Widgery: business as usual soldiers escaped injury by reason of their superior field-craft and training"*. Of course another answer could be that only a few sporadic shots at most were fired (The Sunday Times reports that one "defensive" and seven "unauthorised" shots were fired by the Official IRA; none were fired by the Provisionals before 4.30). Certainly this claim of "superior fieldcraft and training" contrasts oddly with what happened in shooting incidents on 25 April, when no fewer than six soldiers were hit without scoring a single hit in return. 3. One crucial question concerns the orders for the arrest operation. The Sunday Times report shows quite clearly that the decision to mount the operation came right from "Ministers" at the top probably from the Northern Ireland Committee of the Cabinet. Major General in deed as it is in name." (22 January) Secondly. the order for the operation as recorded in the Brigade Log (Serial 159) reads: "Orders given to 1 Para at 1607 hours for one sub-unit of 1 Pars to do scoop-up op through barrier 14. Not to conduct running battle down Rossville Street." (Emphasis in original). This emphasis on not conducting such a running battle in fact suggests that there was a likelihood that they might do so: indeed it suggests very strongly that the original plan was just this. and that Serial 159 indicates a change of plan at the top which was in the event ignored by the Paras on the ground. However in face of suggestions that the Paras grossly exceeded orders, Widgery simply states that: "I do not accept this conclusion in the face of the sworn evidence of the three officers concerned." 4. His answer to the question, 'Who fired first'.... probably the most important single issue which I have been required to determine". is equally insubstantial. Faced with conflicting sets of evidence, he concludes, "that the first firing in the court-yard was directed at the soldiers... It is a conclusion built up over many days of listening to evidence and watching the demeanour of witnesses under cross-examination." In other words, he cannot afford to admit of any possibility that the army is lying. The conclusion of The Sunday Times that the first shots were fired by Lieutenant N is in fact far more plausible. 5. Four men were killed at the Rossville Street barricade. All the civilian witnesses, including the Assistant Chief Constable of Renfrew and Bute, are emphatic that nothing more than sporadic stone-throwing occurred here: yet a single reference to "soldiers" evidence about civilians firing from the barricade" is enough to justify their deaths and absolve the Paras. 6. Similarly with the shooting in Glenfada Park, which is very hastily passed over by Widgery-"1 find the evidence too confused and too contradictory to make separate consideration possible" (of the individual deaths). He is forced to admit that Soldier H could not possibly have fired 19 shots at one target, a man behind a window which miraculously remained unbroken. These shots, he admits, "were wholly unaccounted for".But he makes no attempt to account for them himself, and justifies this by stating that, "there is no photographic evidence". The Sunday Times, however, were able to unravel the sequence of events in this "after another short interval" that they were "noticed" by the army. Yet Widgery concludes that, "the bombs were in Donaghy's pockets throughout... the alternative explanation of a plant is mere speculation." 8.Two men were killed and another two wound ed in Joseph Place (just south of Rossville Flats) - but the army insists that it only fired two shots in this area. Widgery side-steps this contradiction by only dealing with the two deaths as individual cases.
In all these instances, and more, Widgery s approach to the evidence is very clear. Anything is possible except deceit on the part of the army. It is not surprising, therefore, that the report-with a few reservations such as that *in Glenfada Park, firing bordered on the reckless" (but wasn't actually reckless ?)-comes out as a complete whitewash of the army's activities on that day.
This was perhaps predictable, but in light of the new political situation it is still a trifle surprising. For a month now, the Government's whole emphasis has been on 'conciliation' - release of over 100 internees, closure of the Maidstone prison ship, etc. etc. Yet Eddie McAteer was not far off the mark when he commented that the Widgery Report "means the end of the Whitelaw Mission". . There can only be one conclusion: the British ruling class, and its exec utive committee the Tory Government, is split on the question of what to do about the situation in Northern Ireland. That is the only explanation for the contradiction between Widgery's carefully manufactured conclusions and Whitelaw's stated policy in the North.
-Martin Meteyard JUST OUT ORDER YOUR COPY NOW!
AFTER THE MINERS'STRIKEWHAT NEXT? (10p)
This 56 page IMG Publication is much more than just a description of events.It places the strike firmly within the context of the heightened class tension of the last years and puts forward a programme around which militants in the mines can organise.
From IMG Publications, 182, Pentonville Rd.N.1 Please add for postage under 6 copies.