unions was long overdue. The only union at the time that was capable of leading in this new direction, the American Federation of Labour, was unwilling to do so. Ever since the founding of the AFL in 1886, its leaders had a policy of organising only skilled workers into craft unions. Organising workers into craft unions Tended to keep Iner ovided and aiso, sirice only skilled workers were allowed in the craft unions, the much larger number of unskilled The attitude that the leaders of the AFL took towards unskilled workers was expressed by one of them who said, We do not want to charter the riffraff or good-for-nothings, or those for whom we cannot make wages or conditors, unless we are compelled to 00 50 DY other organisations offering to charter them under any condition." This attitude was reinforced by the fact that the too bureaucrats of the AFL were secure in their positions of power and they intended to keep it that way, They Telt that they would be unable to control a mass of unskilled workers organised in industrial unions. In fact, the "leaders"' became so separated from the rank and file, and so impressed with thair own importance that they placed their own personal interests above those of the workers whose interests they were supposedly defending.
Obviously if the policies of an organisation aren't in the best interests of the members of that organisation, then the leaders who set the policy have to change it to fit the needs of the members or they're going to find their organisation falling apart around them.
A.F.L. OUT OF DATE There is another very important reason why the AFL's craft unionism had become outmoded. At the time the AFL was founded, skilled labour still played an important part in produc tion. But by the time the depression hit, mass production on a gigantic scale was being carried out by large corporations. Very little skill is needed to master most of the skills in a factory, so the number of skilled workers involved in production decreased, When the AFL made a halt-hearted attempt to organise factory workers, they tried to do so through the narrow concept of craft unionism. Instead of organising all the workers in a particular industry into one industrial union, the AFL wanted to divide them, even though they worked in the same factory, among all the different craft unions which claimed jurisdiction over the type of labour that the worker was involved in. The development and change of the forces and methods to produce things in America had made the AFL's craft unionism obsolate. It was time for a big change.
In 1935 a big change came in the form of a giant upsurge of industrial unionism which swept the labour movement. By this time not all of the AFL leaders were committed to craft unionism. A group of these leaders, led by John L. Lewis, realised the need for a new type of union, the industrial union. Lewis saw that the steel workers organised in a strong industrial union would greatly strengthen his own United Mine Workers Union. He also saw workers in steel, auto and other basic industries clamouring to be organised. He sensed the militant mood of American workers shown by the number of strikes fought out to a decisive finish. Workers were determined to win their demands even if they had to fight company thugs and spies, the courts, the police and the National Guard. Which, of course, they did, John L. Lewis saw that the workers were fighting mad, that they wanted to be organised, that the time was definitely right for industrial unions.
At the 1935 convention of the AFL a minority resolution proposing the organisation of industrial unions in the basic industries was presented. The resolution was defeated by John L. Lewis and a few other labour leaders went anecd witn their plon 1o organise the unorganised. They formed the Committen for Industrial Organisation but remained in the AFL. They were threstened, suspended, and finally expelled from the AFL in 1936. After they were completaly separated from the AFL the name of the organisation was changed to the Congress of Industrial Organisations (CIO).
Lewis intended to start his organisational drive in the steel industry. Organised labour in the steel factories would directly affect his own United Mine Workers. But an event took plus in phat 1,800 dollars was the moverumindame and the auto industry, an event which changed Lewis's plans and had a spectacular influence on the subsequent development of the CIO.
C.L.O. IN AUTO When the CIO was formed the auto workers already had their own industrial upion. The United Auto Workers (UAW) had started as a built with a democratic structure se the rank-and-file at that time had a lot of say in their uMon. And whet thay sed was that they ngđ no desire to be dominated by the AFL leaders who advocated narrow craft unionism and who would rather cooperate with the coitalists than defend the interasts of the workers. The auto workers saw no reason why they should be divided into craft unions or why thay should cooperate with their bosses on their bosses" terms. But how could the workers get the huge cerporations such as General Motors, U.S. Steel, Goodyear, and other monopoly giants, to cooperate with the workers on the workers! terms? By joining with their fellow workers in a militant and united STRIKE. Just what the bosses and buresucratic labour "leaders" fear most. Naturally the strike played a huge part in the development of the CIO. The corporation bosses fought industrial unlonism in their factories with all the considerable means of power at their disposal. The workers fought back with the strike. But in the organising of the CIO, a very special kind of strike was used. This was the sit-down strike, used with great success throughout the CiO organising drive. The sit. down strike had a number of advantages over the traditional form of strike. It was impossible for scabs to operate the factory because the strikers would occupy the factory and guard the machinery. This in turn heightened the workers' morale since they knew that nothing could be produced while they were sitting on the machinery, It was harder to oust the strikers from an occupied factory to break up a regular outside picket line. The bosses were reluctant to use strike breaking violence against the strikers since they could at any time destroy millions of dollars worth of company machinery.
The sit-down strike did have a number of od vantages and when the United Auto Workers went out on strike against the giant General Motors they needed all the advantages they could get. They were fighting the largest manufacturing corporation in the world, and this corporation, G.M., wielded just as much power in 1936 as it does in 1970. The great UAW sit-down strike against G.M., centred in Flint, Michigan, tumed out to be the decisive strike in the CIO organising drive, It can be said that the UAW made the greatest contribution to the organisation of the CIO and to the success of industrial unionism because it took the initiative of orgenising the workers in the auto industry lin spite of the plans of the official Inaders of the CIOl and because its struggle against G.Mf. was won. In the Flint sit-down, the UAW had shown that militancy and solidarity among the workers could overcome just about everything the corporations could throw against them. Another reason for the importance of the Flint sit down strike was that it determined whether or not an industrial union could exist in the anto industry. G.M, was the key to organising the UAW among all the corporations of the auto industry because G.M. was the largest and most powerful auto producing corporation and it wos the first to be organised by the UAW. In one part of the G.M. empire, Flint, the open shop had to he abolished and and the closed shop established if success was to come in the rast of the organising campaign. It was in Flint that most of the bodies for all G.M. cars were manufactured as well as all the engines for G.M.'s biggest money maker, Chevrolet. Also, Flint was thoroughly controlled by G.M. It was probably the most completely controlled company town in the country, G,M, controlled everybody from the dogcatcher to the judges.
G.M. was the largest corporation in the world. By 1936 it had gained the reputation of being the "world's greatest money maker". In that year its net profit was 225 million dollars; its two top officers, Alfred Sloan and William Knudson, were paid 375,000 dollars each in 1935, Its seventh vice-president was paid 190,000 dollars. The condition of the G.M. leaders was completaly opposite to that of the which a family of four could live decently. The average auto worker made 900 dollars. Most of them lived in foarful insecurity since the foremen could fire almost at will, There were layoffs every year without unemployment insurance. But the worst part was the production speed-up. When working so hard and so fast that by the and of the shift they could hardly stand up, the auto workers were more than ready to be orgaSHUT HER DOWN In June 1936, the young UAW, affillated with the CIO, sent an organiser into Flint, the heart of G.M. territory. When he arrived in Flint there were only 100 union members in the city and most of these were company spies. The organiser, Wyndham Mortimer, was starting from scratch. But with a lot of hard work and good reputation (most of the auto workers hed quit the AFL, which had suspended the UAW and CIOl the UAW was slowly but surely growing There were several work stoppages in the Flint plants and by November the men were ready to strike. On November 12th, two men were fired from the Fisher Body No. 1 plant for resisting a speed-up. The UAW members organised a committee to meet the plant superintendent and demanded that the men be rehired. The super gave in and rehired the men. This greatly enhanced the UAW's reputation and workers were signing up by the hundreds, Walkouts and work-stoppages were occurring in UAW locals throughout the country, But UAW leaders felt that the time wasn't right for a struggle with G.M, on the national level. Not until the key Fisher Body plants in Cleveland and Flint, where three quarters of G.M.'s dies and chassis were produced, and the Chevrolet No. 4, where all of the Chevy engines were produced, were ready to strike. On December 17th, UAW president Homer Martin requested national collective bargaining in a telegram to G.M. management. G.M. rufused, saying it would bargain only on a plant by plant basis. The first strike occurred in Cleveland at Fisher Body, but the union didn't have the strength to maintain a sit-down strike. Two days later the action shifted to Flint. On December 30th, the night shift came on and found that the company was moving dies to other plants in order to decrease the importance of the Fisher Body No. 1. That was all the provocation the workers needed to "shut her down". They immediately began to set up their defences to secure the plant against attack. The great Flint sit down strike was on.
lower then t CORNERS OUR WORL SOTPEALE WANT PE WORKIOS OF AMALGAMATED O As the stete of 4 merican capital defersorater, demonsarions soch as the one close aguin st in fation well con riese to grow. working class haz a militant pazt. DEMANDS At the same time as the Fisher Body No. 1 sit down, the workers of Fisher Body No. 2 struck. This effectively halted all G.M. body production. By January 1st, all Chevy and Buick assembly plants were closed. On January 3rd, a national conferencs of 300 met in Flint to draw up a set of demands. Sole bargaining power for the UAW, reinstatement of all workers fired for union membership or activity, seniority to govern layoffs, new wage minimums, a 30-hour, 5-day week with time and a half for overtime, abolition of plece work, and a slowing down of the samply and STRIKERS ORGANISE It didn't take long for the workers inside Fisher No. 1 to organise an extremely efficient strike apparafus. After securing the plant a mass masting was held and a committee of stewards and 5man strategy team was elected. The committees were organised: food, police, information, sanitation, health, safety, "kangaroo court", entertainment, education, and athletics. Twelve hundred workers stayed inside the plant while the rest left to perform outside tasks. On the inside every worker had a specific job for 6 hours a day. They were on duty for 3 hours and off nine, on for 3 and off 9 in each 24 hour period. The plant was kept spotlessly clean and care was taken with the handling of all plant property. The strikers used car cushions for mattresses and car floors for beds. There was recreation such as calisthenics, musio from radios and phonographs, ping pong, checkers, cards, and the workers even had their own 12-piece band, There was a post office, daily visits by strikers' families, and labour classes in the history of the labour movement held daily.
The organisation outside the plant was just as important as that inside. Committees for food preparation, publicity, welfare and relief. picketing and defence were organised. Because of the great organisation of the strike both inside and out the workers felt that they had built an impregnable fortress against attack. The first wasn't long in coming.
[Flint Sit-down, Part 2, in next issue)
This article has been reproduced from a luck issue of no excellent Amerieun GI paper, The Nexr Step, WAR INFLATION ERODES OUR WAGI Unionists real income lower than lest year AFL -CIO WEST JOINT BOARD Ir a therefore imperiant to recall, as we do in this A BOUR HISTOR Particle, dhar the American
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'WAR INFLATION RODES OUR WAGES Unice's nal loose
FOUR WORKERS AMALGAMATED CIOTHI WANT PEACE WORKERS OF AMERIC