The recent collapse of the proposed occupation and selfmanagement of the GEC-EE factories in Liverpool has
raised many questions relating to the whole campaign for workers' control here in Britain. First, if would be well to remind readers that the occupation had been mooted as a means of combating sackings due to take place because of ‘rationalisation’ plans laid down by Arnold Weinstock since he assumed effective control of this newly created giant combine. Second, it is also important to remember that the proposed occupation was in large measure defeated by the apathy of the largest section of the workers, those who were to be least effected by the planned sackings.
How did it come about that the planned take-over collapsed so suddenly? Right up to the eve of the projected take-over the Joint Action Committee had presented a picture of unshakeable solidarity within the three factories, vet when it came to the crunch only a minority of the workers were in favour. The idea of the occupation was originally conceived by a group of militant shop stewards as a dramatic demonstration, one that would not last more than a few days. And although they obtained the support of the majority of the workers in two of the three factories concerned, these were the smallest units and the ones that would bear the major impact of the sackings., But in the largest, and therefore key plant, no real campaign seems to have been carried out to ensure not only the support, but active support, of the workers. It is on these two points that the proposed occupation came to grief. What the occupation would have done, had it taken place, would have been to raise, not merely the question of jobs, but a fundamental question of power. Such an action would not have only challenged Weinstock's right to dispose of the livelihoods of this particular group of workers, but the very rights of ownership of the means of production by the whole capitalist class. Seen in this light the occupation had been singularly unprepared,
and the events that took place at the mass meeting that rejected the take-over should not have come as any great surprise. Workers' control is essentially a situation of dual power, a regime of crisis, one that is inherently unstable. “Either it quickly passes from control by the workers to self-management and then control of the whole productive apparatus, or it will be sucked into 'participation’, _
Moreover, such a Situation can only arise when the majority of the workers are no longer prepared to accept the intolerable conditions imposed on them by the bosses. Did such a situation exist in Liverpool? It is clear now that it did not. This partly flows from the second aspeci mentioned earlier. The fact that the majority of the workers in the largest plant had not been drawn into active support meant that there was a fatal flaw in the whole plan. No doubt most of the workers involved were against the sackings, and were discontented and apprehensive. But they had not yet reached the position where they were no longer prepared to accept the condilions imposed. Much more shop floor level discussion and agitation over a period was needed to prepare them and to draw them into the situation in an active way. The idea that workers’ control and self-management can be introduced by a small committee is a contradiction by definition. Unless the idea strikes deep roots amongst the majority of the workers concerned, such attempts as the Liverpool affair will be still-born.
What of the role of the Institute for Workers’ Control? No doubt the right-wing press and the ullra-left sectarians will agree in trying to put the blame tor what happened onto its doorstep, each for their own purposes. However, they will be very wrong todo so. At no time was the IWC ‘masterminding’ the proposed take-over. On the contrary, Ken Coates (spokesman for the IWC) said "A body like the Institute cannot of course offer any advice about how particular actions should be undertaken. That is the job for organisations... which are directly implicated."" So, far from 'tmasterminding' the occupation the IWC played a rather self-effacing role, being merely content to service the operation with technical expertise. At all stages the direction of affairs remained firmly in the hands of the Joint ActionCommittee. This of course raises the question is this enough? Is the IWC to be seen merely as some sort of leftish Fabian Society or should it have other functions? It is obvious that, for the Marxist current in the movenient, the IWC can never perform functions analagous to those of the Fabians because the latters fundamental premise was that the existing institutions were open to rationally argued advice, or at least pressure. We have argued elsewhere that the ultimate logic of any workers' control movement must be that of
the overturning of the power-structure of class society. It follows therefore that a pamphleteering role cannot be enough because, unlike the ruling class the Fabians serviced, the working class has got to obtain the dominating position in society. To gain this position it will have to fight every step of the way. For this it needs fighting organisations as well as technical advisory services and research groups - however valuable the latter may be, especially when the studies are being carried out by the workers in the industries concerned.
In our opinion the workers' control movement is a key one for mobilising workers in socialist struggles, It is obvious that one of the great merits of the campaign up to now has been its open character, its non-exclusiveness and its ability to sponsor fruitful dialogue between various shades of opinion. However if the argument above is correct then at some stage the movement must pass beyond discussion to action - and action organised with careful advanced planning or we risk more fiascos like GEC-EE. Certainly it is correct to stress that a body such us the Institute for Workers' Control cannot impose its ideas on any body of workers engaged in struggle. Such manipulation is impossible and is simply the ficlion invented by frightened bureaucrats faced by militants. However, this should not beg the question of leadership and the problems raised by the false start on Merseyside.
In passing to the slage of being the centre or leader of struggles for workers' control the IWC may well find that certain elements withdraw when the question becomes one of action and not just talk. But we cannot hold up the transition from programmatic discussion to action because of such people.
The key question in this respect is how tar are ordinary workers preapred to go? GEC-EE indicated that the ideas of workers! control are beginning to strike chords in wider sections of the class than fur years. But it also indicates thal much more grass roots propaganda needs to be done. If in relation to GEC-EE "very much needed wassomeform of action committee broadsheet", then how much more applicable is that idea to the IWC. Mass propaganda and
struggles cannot be carried on only with pamphlets, only a regular broadsheet which has widespread circulation and a corps of grass roots supporters can lay the basis for such struggles.
The events on Merseyside may well prove to be a turning point for the present workers! control movement. Sucha
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movement cannol be a pressure group, it can only live as a movement of struggle.
Was Merseyside a defeat? We would argue that it was, but only just. The fact that large numbers of workers were prepared to occupy and manage their factories is an indication of the very real progress thal has been made in the last few years, and this should not be under-rated. The fact that ihe take-over did not take place is a measure of the work that slill needs to be done. But ii should not be the occasion for dejection, the movement has yet to engage in large battles. When it has, that will be the time for overall
re-appraisals.